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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CLAUDE L. HEINER and DAN H. 
HUNTER, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. No. 880204-CA 
Category 15 
S.J. GROVES & SONS CO., 
a Minnesota corporation; and 
WESTERN STATES MINERAL CORP., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 
the provision of Utah Code Annotated §78-2A-3(2)(j). 
On December 23, 1987 the Honorable Boyd Bunnell granted 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis that Plaintiffs' 
Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. The Memorandum Decision was entered as an order on 
January 6, 1988 and the Notice of Appeal in this case was filed on 
February 3, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Did the lower court err in granting Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
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which relief can be granted based upon the assumption that a 
subpurchaser of mining claims can enter into a separate agreement 
with the original vendor and significantly modify the original 
sales agreement (to which it was not a party) even though such 
agreement significantly defines the obligations between the 
original purchaser and subpurchaser and such modification, if 
valid, extinguishes all rights of the original purchaser to 
receive royalty payments from the subpurchaser? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action which was commenced by Plaintiffs against 
defendant S.J. Groves & Sons Co. and its successor in interest 
defendant Western States Mineral Corp. (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "Defendant"), seeking damages for the alleged 
wrongful breach of a "Purchase Agreement" entered into between 
Plaintiffs and Defendant. After hearing argument, the lower court 
determined pursuant to the various agreements entered into between 
these parties and others that there was no claim stated by the 
plaintiffs upon which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the 
court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
The procedural facts in this case are undisputed. 
Essentially, the case involves a number of mining claims located 
in Emery County, Utah. In May of 1975 plaintiffs Claude L. Heiner 
and Dan H. Hunter entered into an agreement entitled "Option to 
Purchase and Purchase Agreement" (hereinafter the "1975 
Agreement") with James R. Dickert and Robert Eddy. At this time 
the plaintiffs agreed to assume five coal leases for the coal mine 
known as Dog Valley Mine which are the subject of this action. 
-2-
The 1975 Agreement is attached herein as Exhibit "A" to the 
Appendix. It is this document which is th$ underlying basis of 
Plaintiffs1 present claim. 
In the 1975 Agreement Plaintiffs paid $30,000 cash for the 
assignment of the leases and for certain equipment and agreed to 
pay to Dickert and Eddy an overriding royalty of 25 cents per ton 
of coal mined plus 1% of any money over $15 per ton received upon 
the sale of any coal. 
The Agreement contained the following clause: 
Buyers hereby agree that from and after the 
transfer to them of said leases they will enter onto 
the subject lands and commence mining operations for 
coal with reasonable dispatch and to continue such 
mining operations with reasonable diligence until all 
of the reasonably mineable and merchantable coal on, in 
and under the subject land has been mined, removed and 
sold. Merchantable coal shall include only that coal 
that can be mined, removed and sold at a reasonable 
profit. In the event of the occurrence of an event or 
events beyond the reasonable control of the Buyers then 
Buyers shall be excused from performing the obligations 
imposed upon them under this paragraph during the 
continuation of such event and to the extent made 
reasonably necessary by such event. (1975 Agreement, 
paragraph 3). 
The 1975 Agreement also provided language as to termination. 
It stated: 
In the event Buyers shall voluntarily decide to 
terminate their interest under any of said leases or in 
the event of the default of Buyers or their assignees 
under any of said leases which default shall remain 
uncorrected after thirty (30) days* actual notice of 
such default, Sellers shall be entitled to the 
reassignment of the leases and Buyers agree to use 
their best efforts to secure the approval or consent of 
the Utah State Land Board to such reassignment. (1975 
Agreement, paragraph 5). 
The parties also agreed that they could assign their rights 
under the Agreement and that any such assignees would have the 
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rights and obligations contained in the 1975 Agreement. (1975 
Agreement, paragraph 8). 
On March 1, 1976 the successors of the plaintiffs and 
defendant S.J. Groves & Sons Co. entered into a "Purchase 
Agreement". (Hereinafter referred to as the "1976 Agreement"). 
The Agreement provided that the plaintiffs would sell to the 
defendant the net assets subject only to assumed liabilities under 
the terms of the Agreement. (1976 Agreement, Paragraph 2.1). A 
copy of the 1976 Agreement is contained in the Appendix of this 
Brief as Exhibit "B". The purchase price for the net assets was 
two million dollars together with a clause relating to an 
overriding royalty on behalf of the plaintiffs. It stated: 
An overriding royalty to be reserved in the 
Assignment of the Leases (or reassigned by Buyer) to 
vest Western States Properties, [the successor of 
plaintiffs], its successors and assigns, with a royalty 
on all coal produced and sold from the Lease Property 
by Buyer, its successors and assigns, as follows: 20 
cents per ton on the first 2.5 million tons and 30 
cents per ton on all coal produced and sold thereafter. 
[1976 Agreement, paragraph 3.1(b)]. (Emphasis added). 
In another portion of the contract the following language is 
contained relating to the 1975 Agreement: 
Buyer will from and after the Closing perform and 
pay as and when due all obligations required under said 
Option to Purchase and Purchase Agreement dated May 28, 
1975. (1976 Agreement, paragraph 7.10). (Emphasis 
added). 
Finally, Section 9 of the Agreement was entitled "Termination 
of Agreement" and contained various remedies for termination by 
either the buyer or the seller. Essentially, the Buyer 
(Defendant) was only allowed to terminate under the terms of this 
Agreement for the failure of the Sellers to satisfy the material 
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conditions precedent to the closing of the transaction. On the 
other hand, the Sellers were given the option of terminating for 
any default by the Buyer if it was not cured within thirty days. 
(1976 Agreement, paragraph 9.1). 
Paragraphs 9.2, and 9.3 also apply to remedies in the event 
of termination. These provisions state: 
9.2. If the contract is terminated pursuant to 
9.1(i), Sellers shall be obligated to restore and 
return to Buyer all the payments made to Buyer under 
this Agreement. Buyer shall reassign to Sellers the 
Net Assets and all parties shall thereupon be released 
from any further obligation under the Agreement. 
9.3. If Sellers elect to terminate pursuant to 
9.1(ii), the (a) Sellers shall be released from all 
obligations under this Agreement; and (b) Sellers shall 
have the right to damages as provided in law for loss 
of their bargain by reason of the default of Buyer. 
As of 1981, the majority of the original parties to these 
Agreements had changed by various assignments or successions. 
Virginia Dickert had succeeded to the overriding royalty interest 
of her deceased husband James Dickert. Robert Eddy, however, 
still owned his overriding royalty. Western States Minerals Corp. 
assumed the position of S.J. Groves & Sons Co. which was the 
original buyer in the 1976 Agreement. Plaintiffs Claude Heiner 
and Dan Hunter reassumed the interest of Western States Minerals 
Corp., which was the seller in the 1976 Agreement. 
In 1981 Defendants ceased mining coal at the Dog Valley Mine. 
On October 1, 1981 a third agreement was entered into between 
Virginia Dickert and Robert Eddy as the "Sellers" and Western 
States Minerals Corp. as the "Buyer". (Hereinafter referred to as 
the "1981 Agreement"). This Agreement was entitled "Amendment to 
Option to Purchase and Purchase Agreement." A copy of this 
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Agreement is contained herein as Exhibit "C". 
The parties to that Agreement agreed, among other things, 
that Western States (Defendant) would not be in default of the 
1975 Agreement irrespective of whether Western States mined coal, 
so long as Western States paid minimum royalties of $3,000 per 
month to Dickert and Eddy. (Paragraph A). They also agreed that 
once the total sum of $1,250,000 had been paid as a minimum 
royalty that no subsequent monthly royalty payment would be 
required and that any money paid as a minimum monthly royalty 
would be treated as a production royalty payment under paragraph 4 
of the original Agreement. (Paragraphs C and D of 1981 
Agreement). 
Finally, the Agreement provided that the Buyers1 obligation 
to make minimum monthly royalty payments under Paragraph A of the 
Amendment or production royalty under Paragraph 4 of the original 
Agreement would terminate upon reassignment of the leases to the 
Sellers pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the Agreement. All other 
terms, conditions and covenants would remain in full force and 
effect. 
It is assumed that between 1981-1985 minimum monthly payments 
were paid to Dickert and Eddy. No overriding royalty payments 
were paid to Plaintiffs. In 1985, Defendants reassigned the 
underlying mining leases back to Dickert and Eddy. 
In 1987 this Complaint was initiated against Defendant on the 
basis that it had failed to continue its duty to mine under 
Paragraph 4 of the 1976 Agreement and that such failure resulted 
in damages to the plaintiffs of an amount not less than $1 
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million• A copy of the Complaint is attached herein as Exhibit 
"D". 
On December 22, 1987 oral arguments were presented by the 
parties as to Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, on 
December 23, 1987 a Memorandum Decision was entered by the lower 
court. A copy of this Decision is contained herein as Exhibit 
"E". The lower court found that the 1976 Agreement obligated the 
Defendant to Dickert and Eddy as far as its mining operation but 
did not obligate it in any way to the plaintiffs. Thus, under the 
Court's reasoning since the defendant entered into a separate 
agreement with Dickert and Eddy thereby satisfying them as to any 
mining requirement the plaintiffs had no remedy available to them 
in that there was no independent duty as to the plaintiffs for 
continuous mining. 
Furthermore, the Court found that the 1976 Agreement was 
clear and unambiguous, that the overriding royalty to the 
plaintiffs would only occur as to any coal mined and that there 
was no agreement that a minimum or continuing mining obligation 
existed as between the plaintiffs and the defendant. The lower 
court therefore found that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. It is from this order that the 
present appeal is taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT^ 
1. The lower court erred in concluding that there was no 
independent obligation between the plaintiffs and the defendant 
in this case and that by satisfying Dickert and Eddy the 
defendant was therefore relieved as to any obligation to the 
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plaintiffs. The court misconstrued the various transactions as 
one of assignment rather than sale. The court failed to recognize 
that independent agreements were entered into in the 1976 
Agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant which were separate 
and apart from the obligations existing in the 1975 Agreement. 
2. The lower court essentially found that a novation had 
occurred and that the original 1975 Agreement had been superceded 
by the 1981 Agreement. This finding was incorrect since the 
plaintiffs were not made parties to the 1981 Agreement and their 
rights therefore could not be extinguished. 
3. The lower court failed to recognize that the defendant 
had an obligation to act in good faith towards Plaintiffs and to 
protect the overriding royalty interest of Plaintiffs and that 
entering into a separate agreement with Dickert and Eddy violated 
this duty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THERE WAS NO INDEPENDENT OBLIGATION RUNNING 
BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANT AND THAT 
DEFENDANT COULD THEREFORE EXTINGUISH ANY 
LIABILITY BY MAKING A SIDE AGREEMENT WITH 
DICKERT AND EDDY. 
While the Agreements themselves and the facts leading up to 
them are essentially undisputed, the interpretation of these 
Agreements is greatly disputed. Under the interpretation of the 
defendant, the 1975 Agreement established all of the rights and 
liabilities relating to the coal leases. Defendant views the 1976 
Agreement as merely an assignment of those rights and liabilities 
with the plaintiffs being mere conduits to convey the rights and 
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liabilities previously granted to them in the 1975 Agreement. 
Under this theory, therefore, in order to satisfy the mining 
obligation it was only necessary to go back to the original 
grantors, Dickert and Eddy, and to cut a deal with them in order 
to avoid any liability under the various agreements. Defendant 
asserts, therefore, that once the 1976 Agreement was entered into 
between Plaintiffs and Defendant that its only obligation was to 
pay to Plaintiffs an overriding royalty in the event that any 
coal was produced. By satisfying Dickert and Eddy under the 1981 
Agreement no further obligation to mine coal existed and therefore 
Plaintiffs' overriding royalty was extinguished. This 
characterization of the Agreements was essentially adopted by the 
lower court. 
On the other hand, Plaintiffs claim a different 
interpretation of these Agreements. Under the arguments advanced 
by Plaintiffs, the 1975 Agreement established both liabilities and 
rights. In 1976, a separate Agreement was entered into between 
Plaintiffs and defendant which was not an assignment of the 1975 
Agreement and which contained its own rights and liabilities. It 
was the position of the plaintiffs that the 1976 Agreement was 
controlling except as to that particular portion of the 1976 
Agreement which required the defendant to perform and pay when due 
all obligations required under the 1975 Agreement. (Paragraph 
7.10 of the 1976 Agreement). As part of this "obligation" 
Defendant was required to mine the property as long as it was 
commercially profitable as defined in the 1975 Agreement. 
Thus, Plaintiffs in their Complaint alleged that while 
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Defendant may have fully satisfied its obligations to Dickert and 
Eddy, this did not eliminate the independent obligation going to 
the plaintiffs to continue mining and to pay the overriding 
royalty. Hence, since the plaintiffs were not part of the 1981 
Agreement, defendant was still liable to them for the damages 
caused in terminating the mining operation and in failing to pay 
the overriding royalties. 
The lower court failed to make the necessary analysis of the 
language in these contracts and simply decided that the conduit 
theory of the defendant was correct and that plaintiffs were 
therefore entitled to nothing once Dickert and Eddy had agreed 
that no further mining was required. This interpretation is 
clearly erroneous. 
Preliminarily, it should be noted that Plaintiffs did not 
assign the 1975 Agreement to defendant but rather sold defendant 
the subject coal leases. Paragraph 2.1 of the 1976 Purchase 
Agreement provides: 
Sellers agree to sell to Buyer and Buyer agrees to 
purchase from Sellers the Net Assets . . . . 
Paragraph 1.4 of the 1976 Purchase Agreement defines the "net 
assets" to include the subject coal leases. 
While the coal leases themselves were clearly assigned to the 
defendant, such assignment does not affect the characterization of 
the 1975 and 1976 Agreements. If the assignment of the coal 
leases themselves was all that was required, then the entire 1976 
Agreement would have been redundant and unnecessary to establish 
the rights and obligations of the parties. In reality, where a 
lessee reserves an overriding royalty when making a purported 
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assignment of a mineral lease, the "assignment" is in legal effect 
a sublease. Robinson v. North American Royalties, Inc., 463 S.2d 
1384 (La. App. 1985). The assignments were only a portion of 
the total documentation required under the 1976 Agreement and did 
not constitute an assignment of the 1975 Agreement. 
The characterization of these two Agreements is critical to 
the determination of this case. If, as the defendant argued and 
the court concluded, the 1976 Agreement was merely an assignment 
of the interest and obligations of the 1975 Agreement then 
defendant could have extinguished any obligations to the 
plaintiffs by simply satisfying Dickert and Eddy. On the other 
hand, if the 1976 Agreement created separate obligations and 
liabilities to the plaintiffs, then the 1981 Agreement with 
Dickert and Eddy was of no consequence to those separate 
obligations unless the plaintiffs were parties to the 
modifications. 
An analysis of these various documents shows that the 
position of the plaintiffs is correct and that their Complaint 
clearly stated a cause of action. It is obvious from even a 
cursory examination of the 1975 and 1976 Agreements that the two 
differed significantly in their terms, rights, and obligations. 
The only reference in the 1976 Agreement to the 1975 Agreement is 
contained in Paragraph 7.10 which basically states that defendant 
undertakes to perform and pay when due all obligations required 
under the 1975 Agreement. This language is specific and limits 
any interrelationship between the two Agreements to the defendant 
assuming the financial obligation of the prior contract. It does 
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not, however, give the defendant any further rights beyond those 
contained in the 1976 Agreement. 
The 1976 Agreement represents what is commonly known as a 
subpurchase in which the owner of real property resells his 
interest to another rather than merely assigning a prior contract. 
As noted by one treatise: 
A subcontract by a purchaser to sell his interest 
under a contract of sale is not an assignment, but a 
separate and independent contract between the purchaser 
and his assignee and a subpurchaser. . . . 
* * * 
A subpurchase creates between the original vendor 
and subpurchaser a privity of estate, but does not, in 
the absence of agreement, create a privity of 
contract. 
* * * 
Unless the vendor assumes the obligation, a vendor 
not in privity of contract with a subpurchaser is not 
liabl* to the subpurchaser for the fulfillment of the 
contract between the purchaser and the subpurchaser. 
(92 C.J.S., Vendor and Purchaser, §314, p. 
202-03) . 
See also, Greenbaum v. Smith, 409 A.2d 621 (D.C. App. 
1979); Campbell v. Kerr, 618 P.2d 1237, 1243 (N.M. 1980). 
An analysis of the 1976 Agreement shows that it was in effect 
a subpurchase with the plaintiffs being in the position of the 
original purchasers and the defendant being in the position of the 
subpurchaser. Thus, there was no privity of contract between 
Dickert and Eddy and the defendant except as to the extent that 
defendant assumed any obligations existing in the 1975 Agreement. 
Before a subpurchaser can be held to answer to 
the vendor there must be an explicit agreement on his 
part to do so, or conduct from which the law implies 
such a promise. A subpurchaser does not assume 
personal responsibility to the vendor because he knows 
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of the contract between the vendor and purchaser and 
that it will be forfeited if he does not pay on the 
subcontract, or because the payment under the 
subcontract corresponds with those under the original 
contract, or because the subpurchaser has the right to 
make payments directly to the vendor or agrees that his 
payments should be paid to the vendor. 92 C.J.S., 
Vendor and Purchaser, §314, p. 205. (Emphasis 
added). 
With this distinction in mind, an examination of the various 
agreements reveals the following: First, defendant agreed to pay 
to the plaintiffs an initial sum of compensation for the 
assignment of the leases and for the equipment. In the event that 
the closing had not occurred because of the failure of Plaintiffs 
to satisfy the various conditions of the 1976 Agreement defendant 
would have been entitled to terminate the Agreement and all the 
parties would have been returned to their original status. 
Once the agreement was completed, however, defendant was 
limited as to its actions. Defendant, was required to pay to 
Dickert and Eddy the royalty percentage required in the 1975 
Agreement. Under the terms of the 1975 Agreement it was required 
to continue mining such coal until all of the "reasonably mineable 
and merchantable coal on, in and under the subject lands had been 
mined, removed and sold." (1975 Agreement, paragraph 3). At the 
same time, under the 1976 Agreement defendant was obligated to 
pay Plaintiffs an overriding royalty on this same amount of coal 
mined. Thus, the 1975 Agreement provided the privity necessary to 
require defendant to pay Dickert and Eddy and also defined the 
conditions for mining which was to occur as to Plaintiffs' 
overriding royalty pursuant to the 1976 Agreement. 
Second, it is fundamental that the documents which convey 
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mineral interests are subject to the same general rules that 
govern interpretation of any contractual agreements. Miller v. 
Schwartz, 354 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 1984). As such, where a reference 
to another writing is made in a contract for a particular and 
specified purpose, such other writing becomes a part of the 
underlying contract only for that specified purpose. Lincoln 
Welding Works v. Ramirez, 647 P.2d 381 (Nev. 1982). See also, 
Weber v. Anspach, 473 P.2d 1011 (Or. 1970). 
The parties in this case intended that certain of the 
conditions and covenants existing in the 1975 Agreement (original 
royalty payment and obligation to mine requirement) apply to the 
relationship of the parties in the 1976 Agreement but all other 
conditions and covenants were to be governed exclusively by the 
1976 Agreement. 
An example of this principle can be seen by examining the 
termination clauses of the 1975 and 1976 Agreements. The 1975 
Agreement provided in Paragraph 5 a procedure for termination of 
the leases and reassignment to Dickert and Eddy. The 1976 
Agreement, however, stated that if the defendant terminated 
unjustly then the plaintiffs would have the right to damages as 
provided in law for the loss of their bargain by reason of the 
default of the buyer. (1976 Agreement, Paragraph 9.3). 
Thus, defendant cannot claim the benefit of the termination 
provision of the 1975 Agreement since a separate and distinct 
termination provision was provided in the 1976 Agreement as to 
it only. The fact that the plaintiffs in this case chose to 
make a more restrictive subpurchase agreement than the original 
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agreement is of no consequence as long as the original agreement 
is fully satisfied. 
In real estate transactions such a concept is common. An 
original seller and buyer may sell a house for $40,000 at 8% 
interest with no prepayment penalty or late fees- Subsequently, 
that purchaser may resell the property to a third party for 
$90,000, at 10% interest, with prepayment penalties and with late 
fees. In such a case, the subpurchaser cannot claim the benefit 
of the first contract since he is not a party to it. While the 
subpurchaser may have agreed, for example, to make direct payments 
to the first purchaser this still does not entitle him to claim 
the other benefits of the original contract. The principle in 
this case is no different. 
The type of action which is sought in this case is best 
illustrated by the case of Smith v. King, 722 P.2d 796 (Wash. 
1986) (en banc). In that case the owners of an apartment house 
sold the property to the first purchasers under a real estate 
contract (Contract 1). The purchaser price was zero down, with 
monthly interest installments of $452 and a balloon payment of 
$57,000 due on September 30, 1981. 
Subsequently, the first purchasers resold the property to the 
second purchasers by a second real estate contract (Contract 2). 
As part of the purchase price the second purchaser expressly 
assumed and agreed to pay all amounts still due to the owners on 
the first contract ($57,000 plus interest installments). In 
addition, the second purchasers agreed to pay the following to the 
first purchasers: $9,000 down, monthly interest installments of 
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$200 and a balloon payment of $24,000 due on June 20, 1986. Thus, 
the purchase price on Contract 2 totalled $90,000 plus interest. 
After the second purchasers assumed the property they 
abandoned it and allowed it to be vandalized. Ultimately the 
original owners foreclosed on both the first and second purchasers 
and received the property back. The first purchasers filed a 
crossclaim against the second purchasers claiming damages because 
of the forefeiture. The court in sustaining a judgment in favor 
of the first purchasers stated the following: 
Unless the real estate contract between the first 
purchasers and the second purchasers (Contract 2) 
provides otherwise, the first purchasers may sue the 
second purchasers for actual damages resulting from the 
latter1s breach of contract. The first purchasers are 
entitled to be placed in as good a pecuniary position 
as they would have been had the second purchasers not 
breached the contract. Thus, where the second 
purchasers1 breach caused the first purchasers1 
interest in the subject property to be forfeited, the 
first purchasers are entitled to damages equal to the 
unpaid portion of the purchaser price payable to the 
first purchasers under the contract. Id. at 799. 
(Emphasis added). 
Here, when the 1976 Agreement was consummated, defendant was 
obligated by the various terms of the 1976 Agreement to perform 
including the obligation to pay directly to Dickert and Eddy the 
amount of royalty required under the 1975 Agreement. The parties 
understood that this royalty was conditioned upon the ability to 
commercially mine the property. In addition, defendant was 
obligated to pay to Plaintiffs an overriding royalty on all ore 
mined. 
Had defendant gone to Plaintiffs and shown them that it 
was unable to commercially mine the property then any further 
royalties would be excused under both agreements. Instead, 
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however, defendant bypassed Plaintiffs entirely and went directly 
to Dickert and Eddy for the purpose of eliminating any requirement 
to mine at all. This action assumed that there was no obligation 
to the plaintiffs to continue mining the property under a 
commercial standard and that the sole obligation rested with 
Dickert and Eddy* As noted earlier, however, the 1976 
definitional requirement of mining became an integral part of the 
1976 Agreement and was binding between Plaintiffs and defendant 
just as much as it was originally between Plaintiffs and Dickert 
and Eddy, It was therefore necessary for defendant to satisfy not 
only Dickert and Eddy as to any cease of mining operations but 
also to satisfy the plaintiffs. This it failed to do. 
The lower court relied upon a Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision of Piamco Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 799 F.2d 
262 (7th Cir. 1986) . The lower court in construing this case 
stated: 
The Court quite agrees with the reasoning set 
forth in the case of Piamco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co. 
handed to the court by counsel for the plaintiff at 
oral argument and which case is a federal case from the 
Seventh Circuit. In that case the court found and 
stated that there can be no doubt that as a general 
matter overriding royalty obligations end with the 
termination of the estate from which the interests were 
carved, absent an express contractual provision to the 
contrary. The court went on to state that the 
agreement betwen these parties itself manifests a clear 
intention to bind Shell to make such royalty payments 
regardless of the fate of the undermining leases. 
In this case, we have no clear intention stated in 
the agreement that this would be the case. On the 
contrary, the agreement is very clear and unambiguous 
that the royalty that may be due to the plaintiffs will 
be paid on all coal mined and sold by the defendant or 
its assigns. There was no express agreement to pay any 
sort of a minimum or to continue mining indefinitely as 
contended by the plaintiffs. (Memorandum Decision, pp. 
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4-5). (Emphasis added). 
The Court misconstrued the position of the plaintiffs-
Plaintiffs did not contend that they were entitled to a mininum 
royalty if mining had been legitimately terminated. Neither did 
Plaintiffs contend that defendant was required to indefinitely 
mine the property in order for Plaintiffs to receive a royalty. 
Rather, Plaintiffs contended that defendant was obligated to mine 
the property as long as the property could be mined in a 
commercially feasible manner and that such obligation continued in 
spite of the 1981 Agreement attempting to modify the underlying 
definition. Plaintiffs have never contended that they are 
entitled to an overriding royalty if the underlying leases are 
legitimately terminated because of the conditions contained in the 
1975 Agreement. 
Defendant in this case has made no claim that it was 
unable to commercially mine these properties. Instead, it has 
relied entirely upon its 1981 Agreement with Dickert and Eddy as 
justification for eliminating any overriding royalty of the 
plaintiffs. Thus, under the various documents defendant was 
still liable to mine the property and Plaintiffs are entitled to 
be able to prove what damages, if any, they suffered because of 
the premature termination of such mining. 
The lower court therefore erred in granting defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
POINT II 
THE 1981 AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN 
DEFENDANT AND DICKERT AND EDDY HAS NO 
LEGAL EFFECT UPON THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFFS. 
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The lower court concluded that because of the side agreement 
entered into by Defendant and Dickert and Eddy in 1981 no further 
obligation to mine existed. In effect, the lower court concluded 
that the 1981 Agreement entitled "Amendment to Option to Purchase 
and Purchase Agreement" was valid and that any rights which 
existed under the original 1975 Agreement to the plaintiffs had 
been extinguished. 
The conclusion of the lower court was incorrect. The parties 
to the 1975 Agreement were Dickert and Eddy and the plaintiffs. 
The parties to the 1981 Agreement were Dickert and Eddy and the 
defendant. The plaintiffs were neither notified of the 
negotiations for such agreement nor did they agree to any 
modification. 
Thus, the only way in which defendant would be entitled to 
enter into a modification would be if the defendant had assumed 
the position of the plaintiffs by way of assignment. The 
documents do not show that the 1975 Agreement was assigned to 
the defendant enabling it to unilaterally renegotiate it with 
Dickert and Eddy. 
In essence, the 1981 Agreement was an attempted novation 
modifying the 1975 Agreement. It is fundamental, however, that 
there can be no novation with its accompanying substitution of 
parties unless the original debtor, original creditor, and new 
debtor have all entered into such an agreement. Reilly v. Cook, 
McKay & Co., 381 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1963). See also, Kinderknecht 
v. Poulos, 707 P.2d 184 (Wyo. 1985), where the court found a 
subsequent agreement entered into between the original vendor, 
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original vendee, and subsequent vendee was valid and that the 
original terms of the first contract still remained in full force 
and effect unless they had been specifically modified in the 
second agreement. 
In the instant case not only were the plaintiffs not made 
parties to the 1981 Agreement but the question of the plaintiffs' 
overriding royalty was never addressed. 
The defendant effectively eliminated the concept of "royalty" 
by obtaining the agreement of Dickert and Eddy that no mining need 
to performed. However, the payments to Dickert and Eddy continued 
under the guise of "minimum monthly payments"—not based upon the 
normal royalty percentages. Hence, Defendant kept Dickert and 
Eddy happy while at the same time eliminating Plaintiffs1 claim 
for overriding royalty since no coal was mined to which a royalty 
would have been owed. 
For these reasons, therefore, Plaintiffs cannot be bound by 
the 1981 Agreement and are entitled to an opportunity to present 
to a factfinder their claim of damages for defendant* failure to 
mine the property in accordance with the 1975 Agreement. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT VIOLATED ITS DUTY OF 
GOOD FAITH TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS 
OF THE PLAINTIFFS TO AN OVERRIDING 
ROYALTY. 
Between 1981 and 1985 no coal was mined from the five 
properties. Nevertheless, Dickert and Eddy were paid a minimum 
monthly payment in lieu of a royalty during this period of time. 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, were paid nothing since defendant 
took the position that they were only entitled to a royalty for 
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actual ore taken from the properties. Thus, in effect, Dickert 
and Eddy contracted with the defendant to eliminate the overriding 
royalty provision of the 1976 Agreement by changing the method of 
payment from a royalty based upon ore taken from the ground to a 
minimum monthly payment where no mining was required. 
This type of conduct attempting to circumvent the plaintiffs 
royalty right in analogous to cases in which a sublessee allows a 
lease on property to lapse thereby eliminating any overriding 
royalty of its lessor and then going directly to the owner of the 
property for a new lease. 
This principle can be seen in Independent Gas and Oil 
Producers v. Union Oil Co. of California, 669 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 
1982) . In that case the owner of property executed an oil and gas 
lease to Union Oil Company. Union thereafter assigned the lease 
to the Independent Gas and Oil Producers but retained an 
overriding royalty. Subsequently, Independent abandoned the well 
and plugged it. Thereafter, an agent of Independent Gas and Oil 
entered into a new lease agreement with the owner of the property 
covering the same wells but this time having no overriding royalty 
of Union Oil. Union Oil claimed an interest in this second lease 
on the basis that the effort of Independent Gas and Oil Producers 
was merely a subterfuge to eliminate its valid overriding royalty 
and that it should still be entitled to a royalty under the first 
lease. 
The lower court found in favor of Union Oil and held that the 
second lease was not valid. The Tenth Circuit Court affirmed. 
The Court stated: 
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Oklahoma courts have ruled that a lease assignment 
expressly subjecting lease extensions and renewals to 
an overriding royalty interest converts a new lease 
procurred by the assignee into a renewal of the old one 
to which the reserve royalty attaches. This rule has 
been applied even where the new lease did not issue 
until the old one had expired for lack of production. 
Id. at 627. (Citations omitted). 
The Court then spoke of the fiduciary obligation that Independent 
Gas and Oil Producers had to Union in relation to its overriding 
royalty. The Court stated: 
The fiduciary obligations impliedly created by the 
terms of such a lease assignment form the basis for the 
rule. Where an assignment provides that subsequent 
lease extensions and renewals are subject to an 
overriding royalty, the assignee stands as a quasi 
trustee vis-a-vis the assignor and must exercise the 
utmost faith in protecting the latterfs interest in the 
leasehold. Consequently, any attempt by the 
fiduciary-assignee to procure rights antagnoistic to 
those of his assignor will be defeated. Id. 
(Emphasis added). 
An Oklahoma case relied upon by the Tenth Circuit, Probst v. 
Hughes , 286 P. 875 (Okla. 1930), involved an instance where an 
assignee of a lease allowed it to terminate and then went to the 
owner of the property and entered into a separate lease cutting 
out the original lessee. The defendants in that case claimed that 
the lease automatically terminated when the assignee ceased 
production of the oil and such termination operated as a 
termination of the plaintiffs' overriding royalty. They further 
claimed that since the second lease was entered into subsequently 
to such termination it constituted an independent transaction 
unaffected by plaintiffs' claim of an overriding royalty interest. 
The Court rejected this claim and held that the second lease 
was still subject to the original lessor's overriding royalty. In 
giving its reasons for such decision the Court noted the following 
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principle: 
If a person who has a particular or special 
interest in a lease, obtains a renewal thereof from the 
circumstances of his being in possession as tenant, or 
from having such particular interest, the renewed lease 
is, in equity, considered as a mere continuance of the 
original lease, subject to the additional charges upon 
the renewal, for the purpose of protecting the 
equitable rights of all parties who had any interest 
either legal or equitable, in the old lease. Id. at 
878. 
These same principles apply herein. if defendant did not 
wish to continue operating the mines it was obligated to modify 
not only the 1975 Agreement with Dickert and Eddy but also to 
enter into an agreement with the plaintiffs as to their overriding 
interest. Both the 1975 and 1976 Agreements were based upon a 
good faith effort to require continued commercial mining of the 
properties. Defendant did not have the discretion to eliminate 
that obligation as to the 1975 Agreement by agreeing to pay 
minimum monthly payments while at the same time ceasing to make 
any payments on the 1976 Agreement on the basis that no ore was 
mined. This type of effort is a mere subterfuge to circumvent the 
valuable right of Plaintiffs in obtaining an overriding royalty on 
the production. Neither law nor equity allows such a result to 
occur. 
It is fundamental that the law generally imposes a duty to 
perform contractual obligations in good faith. Leigh Furniture 
and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982); Rio Algom 
Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980); W.P. Harlin 
Construction Co. v. Utah State Road Commission, 19 Utah 2d 364, 
431 P.2d 792, 793 (Utah 1967). Thus, an implied covenant of good 
faith forbids arbitrary action by one party that disadvantages the 
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other. See, W. P. Harlin Construction Co. v. Utah State Road 
Commission, supra, 431 P.2d at 793. 
Accordingly, courts endeavor to construe contracts so as not 
to grant one of the parties an absolute and arbitrary right to 
terminate a contract. Midwest Management Corp. v. Stephens, 291 
N.W.2d 896, 913 (Iowa 1980); Miller v. O.B. McClintock Co., 210 
Minn. 152, 297 N.W. 724, 729 (1941); Fulcher v. Nelson, 273 N.C. 
221, 159 S.E.2d 519, 522 (1968); 1 S. Williston, The Law of 
Contracts §105, at 418-19 (3d Ed. 1957); 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts 
§496 (1964). 
These same principles apply here. Plaintiffs, when entering 
into the 1976 Agreement with Defendant, rightfully assumed that 
the prior 1975 conditions of mining would always be binding on 
Defendant. Plaintiffs could not anticipate that Defendant would 
attempt to bypass them by eliminating the mining requirement of 
the 1975 Agreement. Such secretive action of Defendant violates 
its duty to act in good faith towards Plaintiffs and to not 
actively attempt to defeat Plaintiffs' overriding royalty 
interests. 
The lower court failed to recognize this good faith 
requirement and held that the 1976 mining requirement language was 
essentially illusory and was completely dependent upon the whims 
of-Dickert and Eddy regardless of any wrongful conduct by 
Defendant. This faulty analysis requires reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs in this case do not dispute the concept that 
if the defendant had legitimately terminated its mining 
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obligations then any overriding royalty would have been 
automatically extinguished. The sole question in this case, 
therefore, becomes whether or not under the 1976 Agreement 
defendant legitimately terminated its obligation to mine. The 
lower court concluded that there was no standard of mining imposed 
upon the defendant by the plaintiffs and that essentially 
defendant could arbitrarily mine or not mine depending upon their 
own whim or caprice as long as Dickert and Eddy did not 
complain. 
This reasoning, however, ignores the fact that the 1975 
Agreement was incorporated and used as a standard of measurement 
for the 1976 Agreement. The plaintiffs justifiably relied upon 
the mining obligation requirement believing fully that defendant 
would have to continue the mining operation unless it could show 
that it was commercially unprofitable. The obligation to 
Plaintiffs is separate and apart from the obligtion to Dickert and 
Eddy and thus the commercial mining standard was applicable to the 
overriding claim of Plaintiffs on an equal footing, even though it 
was not specifically repeated in the 1976 Agreement. 
The lower court's failure to recognize this distinction came 
about by its failure to analyze the difference between an 
assignment and a subpurchase. The defendant was not "stepping 
into the shoes" of the plaintiffs as claimed by the defendant in 
the lower court. The plaintiffs were not merely a conduit in 
which the rights of Dickert and Eddy were conveyed to the 
defendant. Rather, the plaintiffs were separate parties which had 
contracted with the defendant for separate rights and obligations. 
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There was no privity of contract between Dickert and Eddy and the 
defendant except as to the obligation of the original royalty. 
As a matter of law, therefore, the Agreements clearly stated 
a claim upon which relief could be granted. At a minimum if there 
is any ambiguity in the intentions of the parties based upon these 
three Agreements such matters should be resolved in summary 
judgment or in a full-blown trial. In no case, however, should 
this case be dismissed for failure to state a claim since the 
legal interpretation of the trial court is erroneous when based 
upon fundamental principles of contract and real estate law. 
For these reasons, therefore, the decision of the lower court 
should be reversed and the matter should be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this day of December, 1988. 
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APPENDIX 
OPTION TO PURCHASE 
AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
This Option to Purchase and Purchase Agreement 
made and entered into this '«* 0 day of May, 1975, by 
and between James R. Dickert and Robert Eddy, herein-
after collectively referred to as "Sellers," and Dan H* 
Hunter and Claude L. Heiner, hereinafter referred to as 
"Buyers." 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, Sellers hold leases currently in good 
standing from the State of Utah on property known as 
the Dog Valley Mine located in Emery County, State of 
Utah, copies of said leases designated and referred to 
1003 
as SL 062712, ML 19231, ML'W*fr3> ML 18783 and ML 17687 
being attached hereto, and covering the land described 
in Exhibit A attached hereto, and 
WHEREAS, Sellers are willing to give to Buyers and 
Buyers desire to obtain from Sellers an option, and in 
the event of exercise of the option, to purchase said 
leases upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set 
f o r th
 # " 
Exhibit "A" 
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NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises 
and the mutual covenants and conditions hereinafter set 
forth it is agreed as follows: 
1. Option to Purchase. In consideration of the 
payment of $10,000,00 by Buyers to Sellers concurrently 
with the execution of this Agreement, the receipt of 
which is hereby acknowledged, Sellers do hereby grant 
to Buyers for a period of three (3) months from the 
date hereof an option to purchase the said leases* 
2. Exercise of Option, The option herein granted 
shall be considered exercised by Buyers upon their 
having within the option period deposited in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, certified mail, a written 
notice of the exercise of the option and payment upon 
the transfer to them of the said leases of the further 
sum of $20,000.00. 
3. Assignment and Transfer of Leases and 
Equipment. Upon the exercise by Buyers of the option 
herein granted as above provided Sellers will assign 
and transfer to Buyers the said leases unencumbered, in 
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good standing and subject to no past-due royalties or 
to royalty interests other than those in favor of the 
State of Utah under said leases and including all mines 
and workings located on the property, together with an 
assignment of unencumbered title to all of the 
equipment and machinery now located upon the premises, 
excluding only the front end loader, the Ford truckr 
the diesel shuttle buggy, the Case crawler tractor, the 
stockpile of coal and all diesel fuel and powder 
located on the premises, all of which shall remain the 
property of Sellers who shall have the right to remove 
and retain the same. Sellers agree that any and all 
fines, penalties, assessments and charges by any 
governmental authority or otherwise which have been or 
may be hereafter assessed upon th6 mine or which are 
related to its operation for periods prior to the date 
of this Agreement shall not be the obligation of Buyers 
and Sellers will hold Buyers harmless therefrom. 
Any such fines, penalties, assessments and charges 
which relate to the period after the date of this 
Agreement shall be and remain the obligation of 
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Buyers. In additionr Sellers hereby agree to give all 
necessary and appropriate assistance to Buyers in 
obtaining a transfer of said leases to Buyers' names. 
Buyers hereby agree that from and after the transfer to 
them of said leases they will enter onto the subject 
lands and commence mining operations for coal with 
reasonable dispatch and to continue such mining 
operations with reasonable diligence until all of the 
reasonably minable and merchantable coal on, in and 
under the subject lands has been mined, removed and 
sold. Merchantable coal shall include only that coal 
that can be mined, removed and sold at a reasonable 
profit. In the event of the occurrence of an event or 
events beyond the reasonable control of the Buyers then 
Buyers shall be excused from performing the obligations 
imposed upon them under this paragraph during the 
continuation of such event and to the extent made 
reasonably necessary by such event. 
4. Royalty. Buyers hereby agree to pay to Sellers 
or their nominee on or before the 28th day of February 
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and on or before the 31st day of July of each year, on 
the basis of the semi-annual accounts for the coal sold 
in the preceding six-month periodf an overriding 
royalty of 25 cents per ton of coal mined from the 
leased premises as sold, said royalty to be computed on 
the same volume as the royalties due the State of Utah 
under said leases plus 1% of all amounts by which the 
price-received by Buyer for coal loaded at the mine 
site shall exceed $15.00 per ton of coal so removed 
from the leased premises and sold (i.e., if the price 
received for coal loaded ready for hauling at the mine 
site by Buyer, but excluding any transportation 
charges, is $20.00 per ton then the royalty would be 
25 cents per ton plus 1% of the $5.00 or 5 cents per 
ton), it being understood that in no year will Sellers 
receive a royalty payment less than $12,000.00 until 
total royalties of $100,000.00 shall have been paid, 
including $28,000.00 representing the initial 
$10,000.00 option payment and $18,000.00 of the 
$20,000.00 payment to be made upon exercise of the 
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option (the remaining $2,000.00 of said $20,000.00 
payment being the payment for the machinery and 
equipment), it also being understood that payments in 
any year in excess of actual royalties due based upon 
production shall be considered as advance royalty 
payments to be applied upon production of coal 
subsequent to payment in full of said $100,000.00. 
5. Termination of Leases. In the event Buyers 
shall voluntarily decide to terminate their interest 
under any of said leases or in the event of the default 
of Buyers or their assignees under any of said leases 
which default shall remain uncorrected after thirty 
(30) days1 actual notice of such default, Sellers shall 
be entitled to the reassignment of the leases and 
Buyers agree to use their best efforts to secure the 
approval or consent of the Utah State Land Board to 
such reassignment. In such event, Sellers shall also 
be entitled to the original machinery or equipment, if 
any, which shall be on the premises at the notice of 
default, it being understood that Buyers shall have no 
-7-
obligation to maintain or preserve any of such 
machinery or equipment on the premises. 
6. Inspection of Records. Sellers will make 
available to Buyers at reasonable times the accounts 
and records of prior production and activity of the 
mine together with all drill hole information available 
to Sellers, including logs, reports and coal analysis 
information. Sellers will also deliver to Buyers the 
mine map and timber plan submitted by Sellers to the 
Bureau of Mines. Buyers shall make available for 
inspection by Sellers at reasonable times the accounts 
and records of their production during the term of this 
Agreement. 
7. Enforcement of Agreement. The parties agree 
that should they default in any of the covenants or 
agreements contained herein, the defaulting party shall 
pay all costs and expensesr including a reasonable 
attorneyfs fee which may arise or accrue from any 
remedy in law or in equity in enforcing this contract 
or in pursuing any remedy whether such remedy is 
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pursued by filing a suit or otherwise, 
8. Successors and Assigns. It is understood that 
the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the 
heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns 
of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the said parties to this 
Agreement nave hereunto signed their names, the day and 
year first above written* 
SELLERS: 
James R. Dickert 
Robert Eddy 
BUYERS: 
Dan H. Hunter 
Claude L. Heiner 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT dated as of March 1, 1976, between 
S. J. Groves & Sons Company, a Minnesota corporation, with 
offices at 10000 Highway 55 West, Minneapolis, Minnesota 
55441 ("Buyer"), and Western States Coal Corporation, a Utah 
corporation, 2330 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84115, and Western States Properties, a Utah partnership, 
with offices at 2330 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84115 ("Sellers"), 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
In consideration of the mutual covenants and 
agreements herein contained, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Definitions, 
In this Agreement, the following terms shall have 
the following defined meanings: 
1.1 "Leases or Leased Property" means State of 
Utah coal lands leases ML 19231, ML1003, ML18783, ML17687, 
and SL062712, copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A-l," pertaining to lands situate in Emery County, Utah, 
containing 440 acres more or less, together with all per-
mits, licenses, approvals or other leases appurtenant thereto 
or used in connection therewith, all as more particularly 
described in Exhibit "A-l." 
Exhibit "B 
1.2 "Other Property Rights" means (1) the railroad 
siding property designated and referred to as the Aurora 
Railroad Siding, at or near Aurora, Utah; (2) the State of 
Utah Special Use Lease Agreement No. 365 for a parcel adjacent 
to the Lease Property; (3) a well; and (4) Application No. 
45337 to appropriate water, all as more particularly described 
on Exhibit "A-2" attached hereto. 
1.3 "Equipment11 means the mining and earth-moving 
equipment and machinery, fixtures, vehicles, rolling stock, 
trackage, other personal property, buildings, and leasehold 
improvements described in Exhibit "A-3," together with a 
quantity of supplies at least equal to amounts listed on 
Exhibit "A-3a" attached hereto. 
1.4 "Net Assets" means (1) the Leases; (2) the 
Other Property Rights; and (3) Equipment. 
1.5 "Assumed Liabilities" means charges and 
obligations of Sellers, liens against the Leases, Other 
Property Rights and Equipment and burdens on production to 
be assumed by Buyer, in addition to the purchase price 
herein provided to be paid, all as specified in Exhibit "A-
4." 
1.6 "Offset Liabilities" means such Assumed 
Liabilities as are to be paid directly by Buyer and charged 
against the Purchase Price as specified in Exhibit "A-5." 
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1.7 "Excess Liabilities" means liens against the 
Leases, Other Property Rights and Equipment and burdens on 
production in excess of those specified in Exhibit "A-4" and 
Exhibit "A-5." 
2. Purchase and Sale, 
2.1 Sellers agree to sell to Buyer and Buyer 
agrees to purchase from Sellers the Net Assets subject only 
to Assumed Liabilities on the terms of this Agreement. 
2.2 Promptly upon request of Buyer, Sellers 
shall execute a Memorandum of Agreement in recordable form 
for recordation by Buyer substantially as set forth in 
Exhibit "A-6M attached hereto. 
2.3 A Closing shall be set at the offices of 
Davis, Graham & Stubbs, 2600 Colorado National Building, 
Denver, Colorado, as soon as possible after Buyer gives 
Sellers verbal notice that conditions of Closing are satisfied 
but not later than thirty (30) days from the date of this 
Agreement, or at such other time and place as may be agreeable 
to both the Sellers and the Buyer. 
3. Purchase Price. 
3.1 The total purchase price for the Net Assets 
shall be: 
(a) Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000), adjusted 
as in Section 3.2 provided, to be paid in certified 
funds at Closing as follows: 
(i) One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) 
to Western States Coal Corporation for purchase of 
the Equipment (Exhibit "A-3M), the Other Property 
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3.2 Payments at Closing shall be reduced by 
the amounts of the following % 
(a) Offset Liabilities, if any, as set forth 
on Exhibit HA-5M and Excess Liabilities, if any, if not 
discharged by Sellers at or prior to Closing. 
(b) Taxes and other deferred costs, if any, 
attributable to the possession and operation of the 
Leased Property by Sellers prior to date of Closing. 
(c) The fair market value of any Net Assets, 
except Leases, not transferable to Buyer because of 
title failure or otherwise. In the event that one or 
more of the Leases is not transferable because of title 
failure or otherwise Buyer may, at its option, terminate 
this Agreement by notice to Sellers and the obligations 
of Buyer and Seller hereunder shall thereupon terminate. 
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(d) All costs borne by Buyer under paragraph 
4 to satisfy conditions required of Sellers for Closing. 
4. Disclosures by Sellers. 
4.1 Sellers shall furnish to Buyer with, or make 
available to Buyer within ten (10) days following execution 
of this Agreement: 
(a) Lease files and other documents of title 
in the possession of or available to Sellers showing 
title of the Net Assets in Sellers. 
(b) Copies of all contracts, and other 
obligations of Sellers, including all matters described 
in Exhibits "A-l" and "A-2#" affecting the use of the 
Net Assets, the sale of production from the Leased 
Property and the rights of Sellers in and to the Net 
Assets. 
(c) Copy of the approved mining plan or 
plans for the Leases, and all permits, licenses and 
authorizations of government authorities for the con-
duct of mining operations on the Leased Property. 
(d) All geological and geophysical maps, 
surveys, core analyses, assays, logs and related data 
in the possession of or available to Sellers showing 
reserves, disposition and chemical qualities of coal 
deposits. 
(e) All books and records of Sellers regarding 
development and operation of the Leases. 
(f) All hydrological data, reports, test 
results, and other data relating in any way to the 
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permeability of the formation from which water included 
in Other Property Rights is being produced or to the 
determination of the yield of the well from which such 
water is being produced, and all approved well permits 
for such well. 
(g) An executed purchase agreement relating 
to the purchase of the Aurora Railroad Siding by Sellers. 
(h) A copy of the partnership agreement of 
Western States Properties. 
Sellers hereby represent and warrant that the 
information and documents provided or made available pursuant 
to subparagraphs (a) through (h) above and to the best of 
Sellers1 knowledge are complete and there are no other 
material documents or information which have not been 
disclosed or made available to Buyer. 
5. Obligations of Sellers. 
5.1 Buyer's obligations under this Agreement are 
conditioned upon the following: 
(a) Sellers' delivery to Buyer at the Closing: 
(i) Assignments and Bill of Sale in 
form appended hereto as Exhibit MA-7M to vest 
Buyer with good and marketable title to the Net 
Assets subject only to the Assumed Liabilities; 
(ii) All documents described in Section 
5.2. 
(b) Performance by Sellers of all obliga-
tions described in Section 4.1; 
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visual examination and face samples (to be taken on 
ASTM standards with split samples provided for independent 
testing by Sellers) that mineable coal exposed under 
ground on any major part of the I seam is not less than 
11,500 BTUfs + 200; 
(d) Reasonable satisfaction of Buyer, by 
test conducted prior to Closing at times convenient to 
Sellers, that well is physically capable of delivering 
at least 20 gpm of water on sustained pumping (12 hour 
test) and is available for use by Buyer pending issuance 
of permit by state; 
(e) Reasonable satisfaction of Buyer that 
legal access exists to the Leased Property and to the 
Aurora Siding. 
If Buyer is not satisfied that the foregoing 
conditions in this Section 5.1 have been met at or prior to 
Closing, Buyer shall have the option, at Buyer's sole election: 
(i) To terminate this Purchase Agreement; 
provided only that this option is not available to 
Buyer for a failure of access to the Aurora 
Siding; 
(ii) To allow Sellers additional time, 
not in excess of sixty (60) days, to satisfy said 
conditions; or 
(iii) To close, satisfy said conditions 
itself, and deduct the cost of satisfaction, 
including reasonable attorneys1 fees, not to 
-7-
exceed Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) , from 
the price payable at Closing; provided only that 
Buyer's acceptance of the Net Assets at the Closing 
shall not discharge Sellers from responsibility 
for their warranties under Section 7. In any 
event Buyer shall be limited to the remedies des-
cribed within this paragraph (which must be exer-
cised at or prior to Closing) for the failure of 
Seller to satisfy any obligation or condition 
described or referred to in this paragraph with 
the exception of the warranties under Section 7. 
5.2 At or prior to Closing, Sellers shall provide 
Buyer the following: 
(i) Copy of a resolution of the stock-
holders and Board of Directors of Western States 
Coal Corporation certified by the Secretary thereof 
and agreement of the Managing Partners of Western 
States Properties, authorizing the sale of the Net 
Assets on the terms of this Agreement and (in the 
case of the shareholders of Western States Coal 
Corporation) a resolution showing concurrence of 
the owners of not less than two-thirds of the 
outstanding stock. 
(ii) Certificate of the Secretary of 
Western States Coal Corporation giving the names 
of the officers of that company and their authority 
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to execute and perform this Agreement in accordance 
with the provisions hereof* 
(iii) Opinion dated the Closing Date from 
legal counsel for Sellers to counsel for Buyer 
that (a) Western States Coal Corporation is a Utah 
corporation duly incorporated, organized. 
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*/-2fa 
to execute and perform this Agreement in accordance 
with the provisions hereof. 
(iii) Opinion dated the Closing Date from 
legal counsel for Sellers to counsel for Buyer, 
substantially in the form of Exhibit "A-8" attached 
hereto, that (a) Western States Coal Corporation 
is a Utah corporation duly incorporated, organized, 
8a. 
validly existing and in good standing under the 
laws of the State of Utah; (b) Western States 
Properties is a Utah partnership duly organized, 
validly existing and in good standing under the 
laws of the State of Utah; (c) the appropriate 
officers of Western States Coal Corporation and 
the Managing Partners of Western States Properties 
have all necessary authority to convey all of 
Sellers9 interest in the Net Assets to Buyer and 
perform all other obligations required of Sellers 
on the terms of this Agreement; and (d) that the 
transactions herein contained are exempt from the 
provisions of the Utah Bulk Sales Act, Utah Code 
Annotated § 70A-6-101, et^  seq. 
(iv) From and after the date of this 
Agreement Sellers shall allow Buyer and employees 
of Buyer access to the Leased Property to conduct 
limited surveys* 
5*3 Following the Closing, Claude L. Heiner, as 
an individual, shall serve as a consultant to Buyer to 
assist Buyer in the management of operations on the Leased 
Property. In pursuance thereof, Claude L. Heiner shall be 
reasonably available as requested from time to time as his 
schedule shall permit, but not more than two (2) days per 
week and for a period not to exceed three (3) months. 
Claude L. Heiner shall receive for such services compensation 
in the amount of $150 per day plus expenses. 
-9-
5.5 filers shall provide Buye^^ith the names o£ 
potential customers contacted by Sellers for the sale of 
coal from the Leased Property and neither Sellers nor Claude 
L. Heiner or Dan H. Hunter shall, directly or indirectly, 
acquire coal mineral interests, by leases, assignment, 
purchase or otherwise within thirty (30) miles of the Leased 
Property for a period of two years from the date hereof/ 
except to the extent that such acquisition may be hereafter 
approved by Buyer. Sellers and Claude L. Heiner and Dan H. 
Hunter agree to use their best efforts to keep available for 
Buyer the services of present employees including a certified 
coal mine superintendent and other technical ratings needed 
for Buyer1s operation, as well as contractors, agents, coal 
purchasers and haulers and preserve for Buyer the good will 
of customers, suppliers and others having business relations 
with Sellers. 
6. Obligations of Buyer. 
At or before the Closing, Buyer shall: 
6.1 Provide a copy, certified by the Secretary of 
Buyer, of a resolution of the Board of Directors of Buyer 
authorizing the officers of Buyer to purchase the Net Assets 
of Sellers on the terms of this Agreement, to assume the 
burdens of existing contracts of Sellers, to pay the purchase 
price in the manner herein provided, execute all of the 
documents and perform all of the obligations required of 
Buyer under this Agreement. 
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counsel for Buyer that Buyer is duly incorporated under the 
laws of Minnesota, is in good standing and through its 
officers has power and has all necessary authority to commit 
itself legally to and fully perform all of the obligations 
assumed by Buyer under this Agreement 
6.3 Provide assumption agreements substantially 
in the form of Exhibit HA-9,f by which Buyer assumes obligations 
of Sellers and agrees to hold Sellers harmless from any 
further liability with respect to the assumed obligations, 
if any. 
7. Warranties of Sellers. 
Sellers jointly and severally warrant unto Buyer 
that as of the date hereof and as of the date of Closing: 
7.1 Title to the Leases is vested in one or both 
of the Sellers free of any liens, encumbrances, overriding 
royalties, production payments or contract obligations 
created or permitted by Sellers, except as specified in 
writing in the Exhibits to this Agreement. Sellers make no 
other warranty with respect to title to the Leases. 
7.2 To the best of Sellers1 knowledge, informa-
tion and belief, Buyer shall not be obligated for any royalty 
or production payment to Sellers or to any third party except 
as shown in Exhibit "A-4", as provided in Section 3.1(b) 
hereof, and pursuant to that Agreement referred to in Sec-
tion 7.10. 
7.3 To the best of Sellers1 knowledge, information 
and belief, no condition now exists that will prevent Buyer 
from continuing mining operations in the manner conducted in 
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the past by Sellers or on an expanded basis as contemplated 
by Buyer. 
7.4 Equipment listed in Exhibit f,A-3,f is in 
reasonably good and serviceable condition, and will remain 
in such condition to the date of Closing/ ordinary wear and 
tear excepted. 
7.5 The well on the parcel adjacent to the Leased 
Property (which is included in the Other Property Rights), 
has to date produced water'for the mining operations heretofore 
conducted by Sellers as shown in the well report and other 
data furnished to Buyer by Sellers and Buyer shall have the 
right to test the same at its expense at the earliest rea-
sonable time available following execution of this Agreement. 
7.6 To Sellers1 best knowledge, information and 
belief, there is access to the Leased Property and Aurora 
Railway Siding adequate for coal mining operations heretofore 
conducted by Sellers. 
7.7 Sellers will use their best efforts to obtain 
clear title to the Aurora Railroad Siding, near Aurora, 
Utah, as more fully described in Exhibit "A-2" upon Closing 
or within a reasonable time thereafter and Sellers will 
transfer to Buyer such title as they shall have been able to 
obtain within such period. Sellers will at Closing convey 
title to the siding property by a Warranty Deed in the form 
of Exhibit "A-IO" attached hereto and provide Buyer with a 
policy of title insurance in the amount of Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($50,000.00), subject only to the exceptions and 
conditions referred to in the preliminary title report, 
Order No. U-15161, dated February 17, 1976, a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A-ll," and thereupon Sellers' 
obligations under this Section 7.7 shall be fully performed. 
7.8 To their best knowledge, information and 
belief, there are no actions, suits, or proceedings pending 
or threatened against or affecting the Sellers at law or 
equity or before any federal, state, municipal or other 
governmental department, commission, board, bureau, agency 
or instrumentality, affecting the Leases or the Sellers' 
title to the Net Assets which have not been disclosed to 
Buyer. 
7.9 Each Seller further represents severally with 
respect to facts within its knowledge that all material 
facts have been disclosed to Buyer regarding (1) the financial 
condition and liabilities, actual or contingent, of each 
Sellerf insofar as the same may adversely affect Buyer's 
rights hereunder in the Net Assets; (2) the explorationf and 
development of the Leased Property, marketable quality of 
the coal; and (3) any other material facts reasonably 
bearing upon the value of the Net Assets. 
7.10 Sellers represent that as of the date 
of Closing all of Sellers' obligations under that 
certain Option to Purchase and Purchase Agreement be-
tween Sellers and James R. Dickert and Robert Eddy 
dated May 28, 1975 are in good standing and all 
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performed and current. Buyer will from and after the Closing 
perform and pay as and wbriyjinrL nil ohTinjriH tirn required 
under said Option to Purchase and Purchase Agreement dated 
May 28, 1975. Buyer shall indemnify and hold harmless 
Sellers from any and all claims, suits and liabilities 
relating thereto arising from acts or defaults of Buyer from 
and after the Closing; and Sellers shall indemnify and hold 
Buyer harmless from any and all claims, suits and liabilities 
relating thereto arising from acts or defaults of Sellers 
prior to the Closing. 
8. Transfer of Operations. 
Between the date of this Agreement and the Closing, 
the Sellers are authorized to continue operations in the 
manner hertofore conducted, to deliver coal to Kennecott 
Copper Corporation at McGill, Nevada, pursuant to existing 
purchase order and to incur and pay any and all liabilities 
arising .in the ordinary course of business, provided only: 
8.1 That Sellers keep and maintain all buildings, 
machinery, equipment, fixtures, vehicles and other property 
of Sellers in good operating condition and repair. 
8.2 That Sellers will not execute any security 
agreement, lien, encumbrance, mortgage, deed of trust or 
other burden upon the Net Assets, without the prior written 
approval of Buyer; and 
8.3 That Sellers shall not enter into or assume 
any contract affecting the Net Assets except as reasonably 
required in the normal course of business without prior 
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written consent of Buyer. 
8.4 Income and costs relating to operations on 
the Leased Property shall be transferred as of the close of 
the night shift on the date of Closing (the "transfer date"). 
All coal on the Aurora Siding on the transfer date shall be 
segregated on the siding, shall remain the property of 
Sellers and shall be removed by Sellers within a reasonable 
time period not to exceed five (5) days. All coal on the 
Leased Property, whether broken at the transfer date or not, 
belongs to Buyer. All wages, other operating costs, insurance 
premiums, taxes and royalties shall be adjusted to the 
transfer date to the end that Sellers bear all costs on 
operations occurring before the transfer date and Buyer 
bears all costs on operations occurring thereafter. 
9. Termination of Agreement. 
9.1 The parties may terminate their obligations 
under this Agreement at the following times and for the 
following reasons: 
(i) At Buyer's election for the failure 
of Sellers to satisfy all material conditions 
precedent to Closing; 
(ii) At Sellers1 election (exercisable 
jointly not severally) for default by Buyer in any 
obligation under this Agreement if Buyer does not 
cure the default within thirty (30) days following 
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written notice from Sellers as hereinafter pro-
vided of the existence and nature thereof. 
9.2 If the contract is terminated pursuant to 
9.1(i), Sellers shall be obligated to restore and return to 
Buyer all of the payments made to Buyer under this Agree-
ment. Buyer shall reassign to Sellers the Net Assets and 
all parties shall thereupon be released from any further 
obligations under the Agreement. 
9.3 If Sellers elect to terminate pursuant to 
9.1(ii) : 
(a) Sellers shall be released from all obli-
gations under this Agreement; and 
(b) Sellers shall have the right to damages 
as provided in law for loss of their bargain by reason 
of the default of Buyer. 
9.4 On termination of this Agreement for any 
cause, Buyer shall return to Sellers all technical geological, 
geophysical, assay, repoduction and related data furnished 
to Buyer, and all such data collected or developed by Buyer 
with respect to the Leased Property and any portion thereof 
and the operation thereof, in connection with this Agreement. 
10. Closing Costs. 
10.1 Each party shall bear its own expenses of 
preparation, authorization, execution and performance of 
this Agreement except as specifically provided in this 
Article 10. 
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written notice from Sellers as hereinafter pro-
vided of the existence and nature thereof. 
9.2 If the contract is terminated pursuant to 
9.1(i), Sellers shall be obligated to restore and return to 
Buyer all of the payments made to Buyer under this Agree-
ment. Buyer shall reassign to Sellers the Net Assets -and— 
^the Option and all parties shall thereupon be released from 
any further obligations under the Agreement. 
9.3 If Sellers elect to terminate pursuant to 
9.1(ii): 
(a) Sellers shall be released from all obli-
gations under this Agreement; and 
(b) Sellers shall have the right to damages 
as provided in law for loss of their bargain by reason 
of the default of Buyer. 
9.4 On termination of this Agreement for any 
cause, Buyer shall return to Sellers all technical geological, 
geophysical, assay, repoduction and related data furnished 
to Buyer, and all such data collected or developed by Buyer 
with respect to the Leased Property and any portion thereof 
and the operation thereof, in connection with this Agreement. 
10. Closing Costs. 
10.1 Each party shall bear its own expenses of 
preparation, authorization, execution and performance of 
this Agreement except as specifically provided in this 
Article 10. 
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10.2 Costs arising from the Closing shall be 
borne by the parties in accordance with the following: 
(i) Sales taxes and recording fees, if 
any, and costs of securing approvals for transfers 
of leases, contract obligations, licenses, permits, 
and bonds, by Buyer* 
(ii) Transfer taxes, if any, and recording 
costs of removing Excess Liabilities of record, by 
Seller. 
10.3 Sellers and Buyer represent that they have 
not used the services of any Broker or other third party in 
connection with this transaction and that no one is entitled 
to a commission or finderfs fee in connection with this 
transaction. Should such a fee nevertheless be claimed by 
any person not authorized so to act by buyer or Sellers, any 
liability or expense incurred by reason of such claimed fee 
will be the responsibility of the party responsible therefor 
or on whose behalf such person acted or purported to act. 
11. General Provisions. 
11.1 All representations, warranties, indemnities, 
covenants and agreements herein contained shall survive the 
Closing and shall continue thereafter unless or until barred 
by applicable law. 
11.2 Buyer may designate a subsidiary corporation 
to acquire the Net Assets of the Sellers pursuant to this 
Agreement and thereafter to conduct exploratory, development 
and mining operations under the Leases and Other Property 
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Rights. It is understood and agreed that Buyer may assign 
this Purcnase Agreement to, or direct the assignment of any 
or all Net Assets from Sellers or others directly to said 
subsidiary, and by any such assignments vest in said subsidiary 
all rights and obligations of Buyer under this Purchase 
Agreement, and in said Net Assets, as fully as would be the 
case if said subsidiary were an initial party to this Agreement* 
Any such assignment shall be expressly subject to this 
Agreement, and Buyer shall remain primarily liable upon all 
the obligations of this Agreement the Same as if no such 
assignment had been made or if assignment had been made 
directly to Buyer. No other assignment of this Agreement 
shall be made to any other party without the prior written 
consent of the other parties hereto, which consent shall not 
be unreasonably withheld. Subject to the foregoing, all 
covenants hereof inure to the benefit of and are binding 
upon the successors and assigns of each party. 
11.3 Notices required or permitted by this Agreement 
will be deemed to have been given when made in writing, and 
transmitted by certified mail, postage and charges pre-paid, 
return receipt requested, addressed to the party or parties 
entitled thereto as follows: 
If to Buyer: 
S. J. Groves & Sons Company 
10000 Highway 55 West 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55441 
Attention: Herbert A. Beltz, 
Vice President 
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with copy to: 
Gary Hutchinson, Manager 
S. J. Groves & Sons Company 
1780 South Bellaire 
Denver, Colorado 80222 
If to Sellers: 
Claude L. Heiner and 
Dan H. Hunter 
2330 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
with copies as may be directed; 
or to such other address as any party may designate by 
notice to the other parties as herein provided. 
11.4 Buyer hereby agrees and warrants, as a part 
of the consideration for the sale to it of the Net Assets as 
herein provided, that it has inspected the Net Assets on its 
own behalf, and that in entering into this Agreement and in 
executing this contract it is not relying upon any repre-
sentations made by the Sellers, or by any agent or servant 
thereof, except as specifically provided in this Agreement, 
but upon its own opinion and judgment, and Buyer hereby 
explicitly waives any claim on that account. 
11.5 Sellers shall maintain in force until Closing 
all insurance presently in effect. 
11.6 In consideration of Buyer paying offset lia-
bilities to Claude L. Heiner and Don H. Hunter and other 
partners of Western States Properties in a gross amount of 
$90,000, Western States Properties shall release Western 
States Coal Corporation from the obligation it now has to 
pay Western States Properties $90,000 under that certain 
agreement between them dated January 1, 1976. 
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with copy to: 
Gary Hutchinson, Manager 
S. J. Groves & Sons Company 
1780 South Bellaire 
Denver, Colorado 80222 
If to Sellers: 
Claude L. Heiner and 
Dan H. Hunter 
2330 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411$ 
with copies as may be directed; 
or to such other address as any party may designate by 
notice to the other parties as herein provided. 
11.4 Buyer hereby agrees and warrants, as a part 
of the consideration for the sale to it of the Net Assets as 
herein provided, that it has inspected the Net Assets on its 
own behalf, and that in entering into this Agreement and in 
executing this contract it is not relying upon any repre-
sentations made by the Sellers, or by any agent or servant 
thereof, except as specifically provided in this Agreement, 
but upon its own opinion and judgment, and Buyer hereby 
explicitly waives any claim on that account. 
11.5 Sellers shall maintain in force until Closing 
all insurance presently in effect. 
11.6 In consideration of Buyer paying offset lia-
bilities to Claude L. Heiner and Don H. Hunter and other 
partners of Western States Properties in a gross amount of 
$90,000, Western States Properties shall release Western 
States Coal Corporation from the obligation it now has to 
pay Western States Corporation $90,000 under that certain 
.agreement between them dated January 1, 1976. 
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11.7 Each of the parties hereto hereby agrees to 
cooperate fully with the other in carrying out the purposes 
and intent of this Agreement and in that regard to do all 
acts and execute any and all documents which may reasonably 
be necessary or appropriate in connection therewith. 
11.8 This instrument contains the entire agree-
ment between the parties hereto with respect to the trans-
action contemplated herein. This Agreement shall be gov-
erned by and construed in accordance with the laws of the 
State of Utah. Any suit for the enforcement or determina-
tion of any right or liability hereunder shall be brought 
within the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this 
Agreement as of the day and year first above written. 
S. J. GROVES & SONS COMPANY, 
a Minnesota corporation 
/ Attorney-in-Fact 
ATTEST: WESTERN STATES COAL CORPORATION, 
a Utah, corporation' 
C^SyssrJL X-By JTss ^tC A • A 
WESTERN STATES PROPERTIES, 
a General Partnershii 
General Partner 
•'7 
r
 / 
By <*/ sf-S- , ^ / ^ 
General Partner 
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AMENDMENT TO OPTION TO PURCHASE 
AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
THIS Amendment to Option to Purchase and Purchase Agreement 
("Amendment") made and entered into as of October 1, 1981, by and between 
Virginia Dickert and Robert Eddy ("Sellers"), and Western States Minerals 
Corporation, a Utah corporation ("Buyer") . 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, James R. Dickert and Robert Eddy, as Sellers, and 
Dan H. Hunter and Claude L. Heiner, as Buyers, entered into an Option to Pur-
chase and Purchase Agreement dated May 18, 1975 ("Agreement") , pertaining 
to leases from the State of Utah, copies of the leases being designated and 
referred to as SL062712, ML19231, ML1003, ML18783 and ML17687; and 
WHEREAS, Virginia Dickert has succeeded to the interest of 
James R. Dickert in the Agreement, and Western States Minerals Corporation 
has succeeded to the interest of Dan H. Hunter tod Claude L. Heiner in the 
Agreement; and 
WHEREAS, Sellers contend that Buyer is in default under the 
Agreement because it has not conducted mining operations since January 14, 
1981, at the Dog Valley Mine, and Buyer has disputed such contention; and 
WHEREAS, the Sellers and Buyer wish to settle their dispute by 
amending the Agreement as herein provided. 
Exhibit "C" 
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NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and mutual 
covenants and conditions hereinafter set forth, it is agreed that the Agreement 
is amended as follows: 
A. Commencing on October 1, 1981, and on or before the first 
day of each succeeding calendar month, this Agreement may be kept in full 
force and effect for the next ensuing month by Buyer1 s payment to Sellers of a 
minimum monthly royalty in the amount of Three Thousand Dollars ($3
 f 000.00) 
irrespective of whether or not Buyer shall have mined during such month a 
sufficient quantity of coal at the royalty rate to equal such sum. 
B. Payment of minimum royalty shall be due on or before the firs 
day of each calendar month commencing with October, 1981, and shall be paid b^  
Buyer within fifteen (15) days thereafter. If Buyer shall fail to make timely or , 
proper payment of any minimum royalty payment due to Sellers hereunder, Buy< 
shall then be considered in default. 
C > Payments made pursuant to paragraph A of this Amendment 
(minimum monthly royalty) shall be treated as a credit against the payments ma 
pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Agreement (production royalty payments) . 
D. At such time as Buyer shall have paid to Sellers, under 
paragraph A of this Amendment, the total sum of $1,250,000.00 (which sum is tc 
be used as a cutoff point for minimum royalty and not a purchase price), Buyer 
shall have no further duty to make subsequent monthly royalty payments. 
E. Buyer1 s obligation to make minimum monthly royalty payments 
pursuant to paragraph A of this Amendment, or production royalty payments 
pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Agreement shall terminate upon reassignment of 
the leases to Sellers pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Agreement. 
F • Sellers waive any and all existing defaults under the Agreeme 
and ratify and confirm the Agreement as herein amended. 
G. Occurrences of an event beyond the reasonable control of the 
Buyer as stated in paragraph 3 of the Agreement shall not excuse Buyer from 
payment of a minimum royalty of $3,000.00 per month, as set forth herein. 
H. Except as herein amended, all other terms, conditions and 
covenants of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment 
in triplicate as of the day and year first qbove written. 
VIRGW& DICKERT 
/ . ' / 
WESTERN STATES MINERALS 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation 
B y ' ' - . 
ROBERT EDDY 
T.niTTST? rnnv /*-LOUISE EDDY 
REED L. MARTINEAU 
STEPHEN J. HILL 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLAUDE L. HEINER and 
DAN H. HUNTER, 
Plaintiffs, COMPLAINT 
vs. 
S. J. GROVES & SONS 
COMPANY, a Minnesota 
corporat ion; and WESTERN C i v i l No. (LV-MfiftS 
STATES MINERALS CORPORA-
TION, a Utah corporat ion, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs allege: 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
1. Plaintiff Claude L. Heiner is an individual residing 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff Dan H. Hunter is an individual residing in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Exhibit "D" 
3. Defendant S. J. Groves & Sons ("S. J. Groves"), is a 
Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business in 
the State of Minnesota. 
4. Defendant Western States Minerals Corporation 
(-Western States Minerals"), is a Utah corporation with its 
principal place of business in the State of Colorado. 
5. Venue is properly laid in this judicial district 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-13-4, since this is an 
action on a contract obligation which defendants were required 
to perform in Emery County, State of Utah. 
6. On or about March 1, 1976, Western States Properties, 
a Utah partnership, and Western States Coal Corporation, a Utah 
corporation, as Sellers, and defendant S. J. Groves, as 
Buyers, entered into an agreement entitled Purchase Agreement 
(a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A), whereunder 
S. J. Groves purchased certain assets from Sellers, including 
particularly, their interest in a coal mine located in Emery 
County, Utah, commonly known as the Dog Valley Mine. As 
consideration for the purchase, S. J. Groves agreed, among 
other things, to pay Western States Properties, its successors 
and assigns, an overriding royalty on all coal produced and 
sold from the mine by S. J. Groves in the amount of twenty (20) 
cents per ton on the first 2.5 million tons and thirty (30) 
cents per ton on all coal sold and produced thereafter. 
-2-
7. Plaintiffs have succeeded to the royalty interests of 
Western States Properties under the Purchase Agreement. 
8. On information and belief, S. J. Groves assigned its 
interest as Buyer under the Purchase Agreement to defendant 
Western States Minerals. 
9. Paragraph 1.9 of the Purchase Agreement allows the 
Buyer to terminate its obligations under the agreement only for 
the failure of plaintiffs to satisfy all material conditions 
precedent to closing. 
10. The Sellers satisfied all material conditions 
precedent to closing. 
11. Paragraph 8.3 of the Purchase Agreement requires the 
Buyer to -perform and pay as and when due all obligations 
required under [that certain] Option to Purchase and Purchase 
Agreement dated May 28, 1975, [between plaintiffs, as Buyers, 
and James R. Dickert and Robert Eddy, as Sellers],- a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit B (the -Option Agreement"). 
11. Paragraph 3 of the Option Agreement provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
Buyers hereby agree that from and hereafter the 
transfer to them of said leases they will enter onto 
the subject lands and commence mining operations for 
coal with reasonable dispatch and to continue such 
mining operations with reasonable diligence until all 
of the reasonably mineable and merchantable coal on, 
in and under the subject lands has been mined, removed 
and sold. Merchantable coal shall include only that 
coal that can be mined, removed and s01d at a 
reasonable profit. 
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12. The obligations of Paragraph 4 of the Option Agreement 
are binding on defendants and require that they continue mining 
operations at the Dog Valley Mine until all -merchantable coal" 
is removed. 
13. Defendants have breached their duty to mine under 
Paragraph 4 of the Option Agreement by ceasing mining 
operations at the Dog Valley Mine during 1981, and terminating, 
or at least taking steps to terminate, the underlying state 
coal leases relating to the mine in 1985, without having 
removed all -merchantable coal.-
14. As a direct and proximate result of such breach, 
plaintiffs have been and will be deprived of royalties to which 
they are entitled under the Purchase Agreement. Plaintiffs are 
entitled to recover such royalties as damages in an amount to 
be proven at trial, but not less than $1,000,000.00. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
15. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the 
averments of paragraphs 1 through 14. 
16. On or about October 1, 1981, defendant Western States 
Minerals entered into an agreement with Virginia Dickert and 
Robert Eddy entitled -Amendment to Option to Purchase and 
Purchase Agreement- (the -Amendment-) whereunder it agreed to 
pay Dickert and Eddy $3000 per month until it had paid them the 
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sum of $1,250,000 in order to be relieved of the obligation to 
mine under the Option Agreement. 
17. Western States Minerals did not involve plaintiff in 
any negotiations concerning the Amendment and gave plaintiff no 
notice of the Amendment. 
18. By entering into the Amendment and suspending mining 
operations, Western States Minerals breached its duty to 
plaintiffs under the Purchase Agreement to extract all 
-mineable coal" and pay plaintiffs royalties therefor. 
19. As a direct and proximate result of such breach, 
plaintiffs have been and will be deprived of royalties to which 
they are entitled under the Purchase Agreement. Plaintiffs are 
entitled to recover of defendants such royalties as damages in 
an amount to be proven at trial, but not less than $1,000,000. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for the award of damages in an 
amount which shall be proven at trial,but not less than 
$1,000,000.00 together with their costs incurred herein, 
including reasonable attorneys' fees. 
DATED this 7 ^ u day o f y ^ : ( ^ , 1981?. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
CtsL^U^ 
fartineau 
By C&'f/L-^J' '\hj.9 
Stephen J . H i l l 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLAUDE L. HEINER and 
DAN H. HUNTER, 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. 
S. J. GROVES & SONS COMPANY, 
a Minnesota corporation, and ] 
WESTERN STATES MINERALS ] 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
i ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 4885 
Defendants S. J, Groves and Sons Company, and Western 
States Minerals Corporation have moved the Court for an order 
dismissing this case against them for failure of the Complaint 
to state a cause of action. It is the contention of the 
defendants that if the facts as alleged in the Complaint are 
accepted as true that the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief 
as a matter of law. The plaintiffs have filed an Objection to 
the Motion and the parties have submitted their Memorandums of 
Legal Points and Authorities, and the Court heard oral 
arguments on the Motion on December 22, 1987, and took the 
matter under advisement and rules as hereinafter stated. 
The plaintiffs base their Cause of Action on two 
written and duly executed contracts. One is dated March 1, 
1976, between Western States Properties, a Utah partnership, 
and Western States Coal Corporation, a Utah corporation, as 
Exhibit "E" 
sellers, and defendant S. J. Groves as buyer. (Referred to as 
Western States Minerals Contract) The other is an Option to 
Purchase and Purchase Agreement, dated May 28, 1975, with James 
R. Dickert and Robert Eddy, as sellers and the plaintiffs as 
buyers. (Referred to as the Dickert Agreement) The plaintiffs' 
Complaint states that the two agreements are attached as 
exhibits, but are not in the file as attachments. However, the 
parties have submitted copies of the two agreements with their 
memorandums and, therefore, the Court has the contracts before 
it. The Court will assume that the various assignments of 
interest as alleged in the Complaint have occurred and are true. 
In the Dickert Agreement, the plaintiffs, for a cash 
payment, were assigned certain coal leases and they purchased 
certain equipment and Dickert and Eddy were given an over-riding 
royalty on coal mined and sold from the leases and the mining 
operation. The plaintiffs, under the Agreement as stated in 
Paragraph 4, were under an obligation to Dickert and Eddy to 
enter on the premises and with reasonable dispatch commence 
mining operations, and to continue until all reasonable minable 
and merchantable coal had been mined and sold at a reasonable 
profit. 
Under the Western States Minerals Agreement of March 
1, 1976, the defendants bought and paid for all of the net 
assets of the plaintiffs in the coal leases, equipment and all 
property rights obtained by them from Dickert and Eddy. The 
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allegation of the Complaint is that under the Western States 
Minerals Agreement the defendants purchased the interest of 
Western States Properties, a partnership, and Western States 
Coal Corporation in a coal mine commonly known as Dog Valley 
Mine. 
An examination of that purchase agreement shows that 
defendants paid $2,000,000 in cash and assumed monetary 
obligations and received the complete Dog Valley mining 
operation. The agreement is explicit and not ambiguous. One 
of the sellers, Western States Properties, reserved an 
over-riding royalty in the assigned coal leases on all coal 
produced and sold from the leased property by defendants, its 
successors and assigns. (Paragraph 3.1(b)) 
The plaintiffs allege, and we will assume this to be 
true, that they have succeeded to the royalty interest of 
Western States properties as reserved in the Western States 
Mineral's Agreement. 
The Western State Minerals Agreement places the duty 
on defendants on behalf of Western States Properties and 
Western States Minerals to "perform. . . .all obligations 
required under said option to purchase and purchase agreement 
dated May 28, 1975. Buyers shall indemnify and hold harmless 
sellers from all and any claims, suits, and liabilities 
relating thereto arising from acts or defaults of buyer 
(defendants) from and after closing". 
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By such a provision, it is obvious that defendants 
were required, and became obligated to Dickert and Eddy to 
enter onto the subject land and commence mining operations and 
to continue such mining operations as long as it could be done 
profitably. This obligation was one owed to Dickert and Eddy 
and was not restated as an obligation to Western States 
Properties in the March 1, 1976 Agreement. 
The Complaint alleges that the defendants satisfied 
this obligation to mine with Dickert and Eddy by entering into 
a separate agreement with them and paying them a cash consider-
ation. 
The plaintiffs are alleging a duty on the part of 
the defendants to perform mining that is not owed to them and 
which does not exist and is not set forth in either of the 
Agreements relied upon. The Agreements clearly state that the 
defendants owed a duty to mine to Dickert and Eddy, and owed a 
duty to the plaintiffs to pay a royalty on all coal mined and 
produced by them. The defendants, as stated in the Complaint, 
have satisfied the obligation to Dickert and Eddy and have 
ceased mining and have produced and sold no coal so that no 
royalty is owing. 
The Court quite agrees with the reasoning set forth 
in the case of Piamco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Company handed to the 
Court by counsel for the plaintiffs at oral arguments and which 
case is a Federal case from the Seventh Circuit. In that case 
the Court found and stated that there can be no doubt that as a 
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general matter over-riding royalty obligations end with the 
termination of the estate from which the interests were carved, 
absent an express contractual provision to the contrary. The 
Court went on to state that the Agreement between these parties 
itself manifest a clear intention to bind Shell to make such 
royalty payments regardless of the fate of the undermining 
leases. 
In this casef we have no clear intention stated in 
the Agreement that this would be the case. 
On the contrary, the Agreement is very clear and 
unambiguous that the royalty that may due to the plaintiffs 
will be paid on all coal mined and sold by the defendants or 
its assigns. There was no express agreement to pay any sort of 
a minimum or to continue mining idefinitely as contended by the 
plaintiffs. 
Based upon the alleged facts in the Complaint, the 
Court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of 
action upon which relief can be granted and, therefore, grants 
the Motion to Dismiss. 
The Court directs that the Attorney for the 
defendants prepare a formal order to this affect. 
DATED this J^-. 5-~ day of December, 1987. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of 
the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS by 
depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Reed L. Martineau 
Stephen J. Hill 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
David K, Isom 
Scott E. Isaacson 
DAVIS, GRAHAM & STUBBS 
Attorneys at Law 
1600-87 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DATED t h i s JHfi/ZsC day of December, 1987 
^ ^ 
Secretary 
